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Should willful breach be sanctioned more severely than inadvertent
breach? Strikingly, there is sharp disagreement on this matter with-
in American legal doctrine, in legal theory, and in comparative law.
Within law-and-economics, the standard answer is "no "-breach
should be subject to strict liability. Fault should not raise the mag-
nitude of liability in the same way that no fault does not immune the
breaching party from liability. In this paper, we develop an alterna-
tive law-and-economics account, which justifies supercompensatory
damages for willful breach. Willful breach, we argue, reveals infor-
mation about the "true nature" of the breaching party-that he is
more likely than average to be a "nasty" type who readily chisels
and acts in dishonest ways, and may have acted in other self-
serving, counterproductive ways, which went undetected and un-
punished. Willful breach triggers extra resentment for what
underlies it-for all the other bad things that the breaching party
likely did, or, more basically, for the ex ante choice he made to en-
gage in such pattern of behavior Thus, when the party is caught in
the act of willful breach, he is punished not merely for this act, but
for the (probabilistically) inferred mesh of bad conduct. This ac-
count provides a concrete foundation for the notion that willful
breach violates the "sanctity of contract." We show that some re-
medial doctrines are consistent with the information-based account.
INTRODUCTION
A. The Puzzle
Is willful (opportunistic) breach worse than inadvertent breach? Is it
more wrongful and deserving of a harsher sanction?
Strikingly, two opposite views now have a long-standing tradition within
contract law, and they have not been successfully reconciled. On one end,
the official position of the common law, as expressed in the Second
Restatement of Contracts, is that the intent to breach is largely irrelevant:
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
** Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, the University of Chicago Law
School. We are grateful to Richard Craswell, Saul Levmore, Ariel Porat, Eric Posner, and confer-
ence and workshop participants at the University of Chicago and NYU for helpful comments.
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The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not been
compulsion of the promisor to perform his promise but compensation of
the promisee for the loss resulting from breach. "Willful" breaches have
not been distinguished from other breaches .... In general, therefore, a
party may find it advantageous to refuse to perform a contract if he will
still have a net gain after he has fully compensated the injured party for the
resulting loss.
The remedies available to an aggrieved party do not depend on notions of
fault or "mens rea" of the breaching party. Subject to narrow exceptions
carved by doctrines like excuse, there is no room for any inquiry as to why
breach occurred.
This strict liability approach to breach of contract has come to be known
as the Holmesian approach, described here by Gilmore:
[T]he contract-breaker's motivation, Holmes explained, makes no legal dif-
ference whatever and indeed every man has a right "to break his contract if
he chooses"-that is, a right to elect to pay damages instead of performing
his contractual obligation. Therefore the wicked contract-breaker should
pay no more in damages than the innocent and the pure in heart.2
This view is explained and supported by the standard law-and-
economics account that the optimal remedial regime is strict liability.' Since
the main goal of remedies is to provide incentive to breach or to perform, all
that matters is to equate the remedy to the harm. Intentional breach is no
different than negligent or innocent failure to take precautions-all ought to
be subject to the same sanctions, and in general the expectation remedy is
sufficient to provide optimal deterrence. 4 Indeed, the law-and-economics
notion of efficient breach, as well as the Holmesian notion of a contractual
promise being no more than an option to breach and pay damages, does not
consider compensated breach to be wrongful. In fact, if it is efficient, it may
be commendable. A willful efficient breach need not be deterred, merely
priced, and the price tag need not include a fault premium.
On the other end, there is a more popular and intuitive sentiment that re-
gards willful breach--even if followed by full compensation-as
opportunistic and wrongful, and that rejects the alleged normative equiva-
lence between deliberate and inadvertent breach. For example, the drafters
of the Third Restatement of Restitution have proposed a unique remedy to
deal with deliberate breach: disgorgement of the breaching party's benefit
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, introductory n. (1981).
2. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 14-15 (1974) (footnote omitted) (quoting
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (1881)).
3. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 118-26 (7th ed. 2007); Steven
Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439 (2006).
4. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & I.P.L. Png, Damage Measures for Inadvertant [sic] Breach of
Contract, 19 IN'r'L REV. L. & ECON. 319, 329 (1999); Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and
Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 32 (1985); Richard Craswell, Precontractual
Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 425-28 (1988).
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from breach.! It is wrongful, the drafters presumably concluded, to gain a
benefit from intentional disregard for a contractual obligation, and any such
benefit ought to be stripped in full and recovered by the breached against
party. Even within mainstream contract law, there are various ways in which
6the fault and willfulness of breach matter for the magnitude of damages.
One need only recall Cardozo's famous dicta: "The willful transgressor
must accept the penalty of his transgression. For him there is no occasion to
mitigate the rigor of implied conditions. The transgressor whose default is
unintentional and trivial may hope for mercy if he will offer atonement for
his wrong."7
This added hostility toward willful breach is common in continental Eu-
ropean contract law systems. For example, under French and German law
intentional breach raises the magnitude of liability to cover not only the fo-
reseeable harm, but also any unforeseeable harm." This sentiment is also
widely supported by commentators. 9 Significant evidence also suggests that
transactors consider willful breach as more wrongful than inadvertent
breach and expect it to be more severely sanctioned.'0
Thus, we observe two opposite views, one that deems fault to be irrele-
vant and another that attaches harsher consequences to different types of
willful, blameworthy breach. How can we reconcile the tension between
these two polar approaches? If all that matters is the harm caused by breach,
why is the intent of the breaching party relevant as a factor that increases the
remedy?
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. a (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 4, 2005) ("[Section] 39 describes a disgorgement remedy: a claimant under this
Section may recover the defendant's profits from breach, even if they exceed the provable value to
the claimant of the defendant's defaulted performance."). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
also recognizes the role of fault. See Patricia H. Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choos-
ing Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24 Aiuz. L. REV. 733, 734-37 (1982) (collecting Restatement
sections where fault and/or willful/intentional breach play a role).
6. See, e.g., George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225
(1994); Richard Craswell, When is a Willful Breach 'Willful'?: The Link Between Definitions and
Damages, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1501, 1502-04 (2009); Marschall, supra note 5.
7. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (citations omitted).
8. JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT 408-11 (2006). See generally Barry Nicholas, Fault and Breach of Contract, in GooD
FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 337, 338-40 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995).
9. Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of a
Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 741, 764-72 (1989); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13-23 (1989); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the
Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982).
10. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Coopera-
tion Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1733-34 (2001).
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B. The Traditional Explanation
The traditional explanation for the hostile sentiment toward willful
breach invokes notions of the sanctity of contract." Willful breach is worse,
so goes the argument, because it undermines more than just the expectation
of the current promisee; it demonstrates indifference and disregard toward
the "institutions" of contractual commitment and of trustworthiness, and it
conflicts with the fundamental maxim of pacta sunt servanda.2 Stated dif-
ferently, a contractual right entitles a party to the peace of mind that a
property right holder enjoys-the right not to be encroached upon. Deliber-
ate breach is like theft: it undermines this security and diminishes the value
of the right. 3
The problem with the "sanctity of contract" account is that it assumes
the conclusion: it does not explain why the contractual "institution" is vio-
lated by willful-but-compensated breach; instead, it assumes that promisees,
or members of the community, will suffer additional deprivation if the
breach is deliberate, in the same way that they feel violated when their
property is transgressed. For most contracting parties, however, a contract is
not a gospel subject to some perceived sanctity, but merely a mutually ad-
vantageous instrumental arrangement that is negotiated in order to create
value. Why condemn an attempt by one party to increase the overall con-
tractual pie through, say, a willful search for more profitable opportunities?
If such opportunities benefit one party and do not harm the other, why are
they regarded with distaste? Many law-and-economics writers, most re-
cently Shavell, contend that had the parties written a complete contract that
anticipated potential breach opportunity, they would likely have included an
express term releasing the promisor from the obligation to perform any time
it turned out to be inefficient.14 That is, the parties would have made a spe-
cific arrangement that permitted deliberate breach-in fact, encouraged it-
only if it was fully compensated (either ex post through damages or ex ante
through a price adjustment). If they could have been made better off by al-
lowing a deliberate breach to occur, why should they be saddled with the
costly burden of the sanctity of contract?
Thus, to those who regard a contract as a vehicle for promoting the con-
tracting parties' legitimate commercial interests there remains a puzzle:
How is it that willful breach is considered, even by sophisticated parties, to
be faulty and wrongful? Why are parties resentful to a practice that, at its
core, appears to be joint-welfare maximizing? Why do businessmen reject
11. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1230; Craswell, supra note 6 at 1505-07; Friedmann, supra
note 9, at 3-4; Marschall, supra note 5, at 739-41.
12. See FH 20/82 Adras Bldg. Material Ltd. v. Harlow & Jones Gmbh [1988] IsrSC 42(1)
221, translated in 3 RESTITUTION L. REV. 235 (1995).
13. See Friedmann, supra note 9, at 3.
14. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 308 (2004); Shavell,
supra note 3, at 441.
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the notion of efficient breach? Is there a more subtle reason why a willful
breach is perceived to justify supercompensatory damages?
C. An Information-Based Explanation
We argue that willful breach triggers a stronger resentment not because
of the harm it causes, but rather because of the harm it reveals. Willful
breach is not any more harmful, nor does it infringe any broader societal
interest. There is no sanctity to contract and no social institution or public
good is being violated by willful breach. Rather, willful breach is a prob-
abilistic indication that the breaching party is the type of transactor who
readily chisels and acts in a dishonest way, and has likely exercised such bad
faith in other occasions without being sanctioned. An act of willful breach
reveals the true nature of the contracting partner: one who would take any
opportunity to divert value, if he can get away with it. This party may act in
other self-serving, counterproductive ways that often go undetected and un-
punished. Occasionally, when this party's opportunistic act is observed and
its true nature is revealed, it triggers resentment for what underlies it-for
all the other bad things that he likely did, for the choice he made to engage
in this pattern of behavior. That is, when this party is caught in the act of
willful breach, he is punished not merely for this act, but for being a nasty
type.
Intuitively, this idea tracks a common sentiment experienced by parties
who are subject to deliberate breach. Often, it is not the deprivation resulting
from the immediate breach that creates a sense of exploitation for the ag-
grieved parties, but rather the realization that their partner was not as honest
and dependable as they perceived-that he is the type of partner who cares
less about their expectations and who would chisel if he can get away with
it. Is this why passengers dislike airlines' overbooking strategy? Surely,
these passengers do not experience any immediate loss from what is in fact
a deliberate booking strategy that leads to occasional nonperformance (in-
deed, they often line up to receive the offered compensation). But it is
perceived as a symptom of a ruthless strategy of poor service, of skimming
off various passenger privileges. They are angry for what is revealed to be
this underlying nonfriendly pattern of treatment.'
5
This is also, we believe, why individuals are offended by a breach that is
motivated by the breaching party's desire to serve a higher bidder. These
breaches are fully detected and compensated, and are probably efficient. But
they leave the breached-against party angry for the way he was treated.
What underlies this resentment is not necessarily that the present breach was
15. See, e.g., Micheline Maynard & Michelle Higgins, As Overbooked Flights Rise, So Do
Payoffs for the Bumped, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2008, at Al. A common sentiment reported is that
"overbooking is a conscious fraud, in that the seller has sold a contract knowing that it might not
honor that contract.' Posting of Dan to http://community.nytimes.com/article/comments/2008/08/23/
business/23bump.html?permid=7 (Aug. 23, 2008, 07:23 EST). One passenger is quoted as saying,
"If flights are being overbooked, then what does that say about how the airline runs their business?"
Maynard & Higgins, supra.
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not bargained for, but the realization of the victim that his contracting part-
ner is the type who could potentially commit other unpleasant acts to benefit
himself.
To be sure, this explanation is not in conflict with notions of "sanctity of
contract." It provides, however, a grounding for this notion. The sanctity of
contract is infringed not by the willful breach per se, but by the propensity
to disregard the full scope of the contractual obligation and to chisel away at
it. Since every contract is in various ways incomplete, the less-than-fully
specified obligations ought to be performed in a way that preserves the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties. The sanctity of contract, under this view,
is nothing more than a reasonable supplementation of underspecified or un-
derenforced terms.
A party infringes the sanctity of contract when he acts in a way that is
inconsistent with this expectation. Sometimes it is called bad faith.,6 But
since this party can often escape detection, the sanction needs to be multi-
plied when the bad faith is detected. If the nasty types were caught every
time they misbehaved, there would be no need for supercompensatory sanc-
tions, and no need for a willful breach multiplier.
This imperfect-detection explanation for supercompensatory damages
for deliberate breach of contract builds on the economic rationale for puni-
tive damages in torts. 7 It has also been recognized in passing by contracts
commentators.' 8 In an important way, though, the justification we develop
for supercompensatory sanctions differs from these prior imperfect-
detection explanations. In a standard imperfect-detection account, the of-
fender commits a wrongful act that is detected only by chance. The lower
this detection chance, the higher the necessary damage multiplier. This ac-
count, however, fails to explain the prevalence of punitive damages in cases
of deliberate aggression (the metaphorical "punch in the face"), since those
are often the easiest to detect. Indeed, in our account, willful breach is de-
tected with certainty. Thus, even if it were subject only to regular
compensatory damages, it would be properly deterred. There is no need,
then, for a damages booster to deter the isolated act of willful breach.
Where our account differs from the standard detection rationale is in
noting that willful breach is part of an underlying pattern of behavior, most
16. See Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 1991).
17. Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 79-
80 (1982) (explaining that intentional wrongdoing reveals information about illicit gains derived by
the wrongdoer, requiring higher sanction to deter); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive
Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998) (providing an imperfect-detection
rationale for punitive damages in tort law).
18. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 6 (arguing that expected damages for breach are often too
low, due to a below 100 percent probability of suit among other things, and that courts may be justi-
fied in characterizing a breach as willful in order to raise damages to the efficient level); Linda
Curtis, Note, Damage Measurements for Bad Faith Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 39
STAN. L. REV. 161 (1986) (explaining that supercompensatory damages are an efficient response to
imperfect enforcement, resulting from either imperfect detection or from high litigation costs that
reduce the probability of suit even when the breach is detected).
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of which is nondetectable.' 9 There are other aspects of the promisor's behav-
ior that are wrongful and yet undetectable. They do not get sanctioned
directly. When a willful breach occurs, it indicates that these other wrongful
behaviors are (statistically) more likely to have happened than was previ-
ously assumed. Given that they went unpunished (and undeterred), the court
takes the present damage-infliction opportunity to increase the sanction.
Thus, the damages booster that is attached to willful breach accounts for the
inferred undetected harm and it is intended to change the underlying incen-
tive to become the type of rent-seeking transactor that exploits opportunities
to chisel and perform in subpar fashion.
This feature of the information-based theory, i.e., that one breach reveals
information about other, potentially very different breaches, raises the ques-
tion of scope. How broad and far-reaching are the inferences that courts can
draw from a breach of contract? Can a breach of contract teach us that the
breaching promisor is a low-integrity type who is also more likely to cheat
on taxes or misrepresent insurance claims? Should we raise damages for
breach of contract to punish the promisor for this increased likelihood of tax
or insurance fraud? We answer the first question with a 'maybe,' and the
second question with a 'no.' Our theory of willful breach is a theory about
the optimal design of default rules in contract law. This theory recommends
a supercompensatory damages default when the contracting parties would
have adopted such a rule themselves, absent impediments to more complete
contracting. The parties would want to impose supercompensatory damages
for a breach that reveals information about other, undetected breaches of
their contract. They would not want their contract to subsidize the state's
tax-enforcement efforts or insurance companies' fraud squad .
As should be apparent by now, our definition of willful breach has noth-
ing to do with the mental state of the breaching promisor. Rather we adopt a
functional approach, defining as willful a breach that merits the imposition
of supracompensatory damages, because it reveals information about other
undetected breaches. Still, this functional approach resonates with the moral
intuitions that separate more and less blameworthy breaches: a breach is
more blameworthy if it is the product of an underlying trait or inadequate
precaution that links this breach with other (undetected) breaches.
Part I develops the information theory of willful breach. Part II applies
this theory to prominent doctrines of willful breach.
19. The "underlying pattern" theory also distinguishes our account from Cooter's informa-
tion-based theory. See Cooter, supra note 17. Here, the information that is revealed is not the gain
enjoyed by the wrongdoer, but the likelihood that this gain appears systematically in a variety of
contexts.
20. The supracompensatory damages rule increases the contract price that the promisee pays.
The promisee is happy to pay this higher price to the extent that she is paying for added incentives
to avoid other, undetected breaches. She may be less happy to pay a higher price to bolster the pro-
misor's incentives to pay taxes.
Willful Breach 1485June 2009]
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I. AN INFORMATION THEORY OF WILLFUL BREACH
A. The Model
In this Section, we present the basic analytical argument through a styl-
ized example. In the next Section we discuss how the argument extends to
more general settings.
1. Framework of Analysis
Imagine a service contract for a prepaid price. The parties have a com-
plete understanding as to the scope of the work, but cannot fully describe it
in the contract, because some aspects of performance are nonverifiable (that
is, cannot be proven in court). A useful example to have in mind is a food
catering contract-it is hard to prove in court how the food tasted.
Specifically, we make the following assumptions: it is up to the service
provider (hereinafter, the "promisor") to set the quality of performance,
which can take one of three levels: Standard ("S"), Mediocre ("M"), and
Terrible ("T"). Standard performance produces a value of $50 for the client
(the "promisee"). Mediocre performance produces a value of $40, and Ter-
rible performance produces a value of $0. Courts can tell when performance
is Terrible, but they might or might not be able to distinguish between Me-
diocre and Standard, and we will consider both cases in the analysis below.
The cost to the promisor of performance depends on three factors. First,
it depends on the quality of performance-S, M, or T-and the better the
quality the higher the cost. Second, it depends on a general ex ante invest-
ment or effort expended by the seller. We assume that the seller can choose
either High ("H") or Low ("L") investment. L costs $0; H costs $25. Intui-
tively, this investment can be in things like inventory, special skill, market
contacts, high-end equipment-anything that is costly and renders the ex-
pected performance quality higher and/or reduces the cost of high-quality
performance. This investment does not have to be relationship specific.
Third, the cost of performance depends on some random factors that cannot
be influenced by the parties (such as price of materials, climate effects). We
assume, for simplicity, that these random factors can have one of two reali-
zations, Good ("G") or Bad ("B"). Prior to the contract, these random
factors are summarized by a probability distribution. We denote by q (a
number between 0 and 1) the probability that the state of nature will be G;
1-q is therefore the probability that the state of nature will be B. In state G,
performance costs are generally lower than in state B.





COST OF PERFORMANCE TO PROMISOR IN DOLLARS
Quality of High Investment Low Investment
Performance G-state B-state G-state B-state
Standard 0 20 25 100
Mediocre 0 20 20 75
Terrible 0 0 0 0
Notice that the cost of Terrible performance is assumed to be always $0
(recall that it also produces a value of $0). Otherwise, High investment
makes it cheaper to produce S quality regardless of the state of nature. High
investment also reduces the cost differential between M quality and S qual-
ity, and for expositional purposes we assume a zero-cost differential
between M and S. 21 With Low investment, M quality is cheaper to produce
than S quality. Finally, notice that there is one contingency-Low invest-
ment, Bad state-for which the cost of performance is higher than the value.
The timing of the model is the following: At time 0, the promisor makes
an investment (H or L) that is unobservable to the client and cannot be veri-
fied in court. At time 1, the parties enter a contract for a fixed price and the
client pays the price in full. The contract requires the promisor to provide S
quality. At time 2, the state of nature realizes either B or G. At time 3, the
promisor chooses the quality of performance, S, M, or T, and incurs the cor-
responding cost. Finally, at time 4, if the promisor delivers less than S
quality, there might be damage consequences imposed by courts.
2. Efficient Performance
Should the promisor take the costly High investment? Should he deliver
the Standard performance, given the effort he took and the state of nature?
If the promisor takes High investment, the total expected social value,22
W(H), is:
W(H) = -25 + 50q + (50-20)(1--q) = 5+20q
Investment costs $25; with probability q, the cost for S performance will
be 0, hence net value of performance will be 50; and with probability (1-q)
the cost of performance will be 20 for S and for M, so given that S creates
value of 50 and M a value of only 40, it would be efficient to deliver S,
hence net value of performance will be (50-20).
If the promisor takes Low investment, the total expected social value,
W(L), is:
W(L) = (50-25)q + 0. (I-q) = 25q
21. We later discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption. See infra note 24.
22. The total expected social value is a measure of all the pecuniary effects attributed to the
promisor's investment. In this model, the total expected social value includes the cost of the invest-
ment and the net value of performance that is expected to arise.
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Investment costs $0; with probability q, the cost of performance will be
25 for S and 20 for M, so given that S creates value of 50 and M a value of
only 40, it would be efficient to deliver S, hence net value of performance
will be (50-25); and with probability (1-q), performance will cost 100 for S
or 75 for M, so it will be efficient to breach (net value of 0).
Comparing the expected value of High and Low investment, W(H) >
W(L) for all q < 1,23 which means that High investment is socially desirable.
The reason is that High ex ante effort, while costly, more than compensates
for this added cost by reducing the ex post cost of performance and increas-
ing the net gain from delivering S quality.
3. Expectation Damages with Perfect Information
We now turn to examine the incentives of the promisor. We begin with
the benchmark case in which courts can distinguish between the different
qualities of performance. Here, the client will be able to recover expectation
damages of $10 when quality is M or $50 when quality is T.
If the promisor takes High investment, then his expected cost, C(H), will
be:
C(H) = 25 + q. 0 + (i-q) - 20 = 45-20q
Investment costs $25; with probability q, the cost for S quality (to which
he is obligated under the contract) will be 0; and with probability (l-q) the
cost will be 20 for S and for M, and, given the liability that M entails, it
would be better to deliver S.
If the promisor takes Low investment, then his expected cost, C(L), will
be:
C(L) = q. 25 + (1-q) .50 = 50-25q
Investment costs $0; with probability q, the cost of performance will be
25 for S and 20 for M, and since M leaves him with liability of $10, he will
choose S and avoid the liability; with probability (l-q) the cost of perform-
ance will be 100 for S or 75 for M, so the promisor will breach and pay $50
damages.
Comparing the private payoff for the two investment levels, we can see
that C(H) < C(L) for all q < 1, which means that the promisor will always
choose the socially optimal High investment level. The difference between
the private costs of H and L is exactly equal to the difference between the
social value from H and L, for the familiar reason that expectation damages
provide full internalization. Nothing in the current model alters this bench-
mark.
23. Recall that q is the probability of the Good state of nature and thus by definition it cannot
be greater than I.
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4. Expectation Damages with Imperfect Information
The key assumption we will make now is that courts cannot detect
Mediocre quality and cannot assess damages for the difference between
Standard and Mediocre. This is why we introduced the Mediocre level into
the model: to capture the notion that performance can deviate from what is
promised in ways that are clear to the parties but are too subtle for courts to
see (e.g., the taste of the catered food). Thus, if the promisor delivers M, he
will escape liability and will not have to pay the $10 decline in expectation
value. It will not be surprising to see that when certain breaches go unde-
tected, the promisor is more likely to commit such breaches. We show that
this will affect his ex ante choice of investment.
If the promisor takes High investment, his expected cost, C(H), will now
be:
C(H) = 25 + q . 0 + (l-q) . 20 = 45-20q
Investment costs $25; with probability q, the cost for S quality (to which he
is obligated under the contract) will be 0; and with probability (l-q) the cost
will be 20 for S or for M. Thus, for High investment, the promisor's cost is
exactly as under the perfect-information benchmark.
If the promisor takes Low investment, then his expected cost, C(L), will
be:
C(L) = q. 20 + (I-q) .50 = 50-30q
Investment costs $0; with probability q, the cost of performance will be
25 for S and 20 for M, and, since there will be no liability for M, he will
choose M and bear a cost of $20; with probability (I-q) the cost of perform-
ance will be 100 for S or 75 for M, so the promisor will breach and pay
damages of $50.
Comparing the private payoff for the two investment levels, we can now
see that C(H) < C(L) for all q < 2. Whenever q > , the promisor will inef-
ficiently make Low investment. The reason for the distortion has to do with
the undetectability of M quality. For L investments, when the state is G the
promisor will deliver only M quality and escape liability, thus failing to take
into account the full social benefit of High investment in terms of the in-
crease in the (net) value of performance. 4
5. Supercompensatory Damages
When M quality performance cannot be detected, there is no occasion
for the court to impose damages for this conduct. The only time the court
24. The argument becomes more nuanced when the cost of S quality exceeds the cost of M
quality also with High effort. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. In this case, the undetect-
ability of M quality reduces the expected cost of both Low effort and High effort (i.e., even with
High effort the promisor will inefficiently choose M quality). Still, this undesirable effect will gen-
erally be larger for Low effort, since High effort can be expected to reduce the difference between
the ex post costs of S quality and M quality.
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imposes any kind of damages is when the promisor delivers T quality. So
far, we assumed that damages are compensatory, restoring the promisee's
expectation of $50 value. We now show what happens when damages ("D")
for T quality are increased above $50, and demonstrate that this can correct
the promisor's ex ante choice of inefficient Low investment.
If the promisor takes High investment, then his expected cost, C(H), will
be unchanged relative to the expectation-damages regime, since he would
never choose T quality and thus would never pay any damages. His cost,
C(H), continues to be 45-20q. If, instead, the promisor takes Low invest-
ment, then his expected cost, C(L), will be higher relative to the expectation-
damages regime, because in the B-state he would choose T quality. As long
as D < 75, the promisor will prefer to breach and pay D over performance of
M quality at a cost of 75. His cost will thus be:
C(L) = q. 20 + (l-q). D
The promisor will choose H, if C(H) < C(L), or:
45 - 40q
1-q
Note that for q < 0.5, D < 50, which means that no increase in damages
above 50 is needed. Of course, q < 0.5 is the case in which there is no dis-
tortion in the first place and indeed there is no need to correct the promisor's
incentives. But for any q > 0.5, which is when (as we saw earlier) the distor-
tion would otherwise occur, the formula above implies D > 50. If, say, q =
0.75, then D = 60, representing a 20% multiplier over expectation damages
of 50. If, instead, q = 0.8, then D = 65, a 30% multiplier. Thus, as long as q
is not too high, the court can correct the distortion in investment effort by
imposing supercompensatory damages.' 5
B. Informal Lessons from the Example
The analysis demonstrates how a party's choice of Low investment can
lead this party to breach in situations where, had he taken higher (and more
efficient) investment, he would have chosen to perform more adequately.
Increased liability for ex post breach can correct the ex ante incentive to
invest.
This analysis can apply to various contexts, but here we want to invoke
its possible application to the problem of willful breach. In the model, a
promisor who delivered Terrible quality "revealed" himself to be one who
made Low investment-it is only when a promisor made such Low
25. If q • 0.86, then D > 75. In this scenario, the promisor will prefer to perform M at a cost
of 75 rather than T and pay damages. For such high q, the promisor will always have a lower ex-
pected cost for L-effort, and the distortion cannot be corrected. The reason, in the model, is that the
promisor who invested L still has the option to incur the high cost of performance, in which case
there will be no occasion for the court to impose punitive damages.
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investment that he might end up preferring (in the Bad state of nature) to
breach, deliver Terrible quality, and pay damages. The reason why a damage
multiplier was needed in this situation of Terrible quality was not to achieve
full compensation for some excess harm, nor to correct for some underde-
tection of Terrible quality. It was needed because the information that was
revealed suggested that this promisor invested Low effort and thus was more
likely to commit undetected breach of a different kind (Mediocre quality)
and escape liability in some situations. The added liability was an indirect
way to pay for other types of wrongdoing.
In the willful breach analogy, a promisor makes a choice-analogized to
the Low/High investment decision-of what type of practices to follow.
High investment is analogous to a practice of high integrity: it costs more to
build, but once it is in place it guarantees a higher ability to perform in a
satisfactory way. Thus, a party can invest in quality controls, excess capac-
ity, training, information, reputation of its brand, good will and
networking-anything that makes it less likely, even if a bad contingency
occurs, that this party will have an incentive to commit willful breach. When
a party does commit willful breach, the inference that is drawn is that this
party is of the low-integrity or low-capacity type, and that this must have put
him in a position to occasionally commit various sorts of undetected breach.
The essential assumption that, we believe, makes the model applicable
to the willful breach context is the idea that willful breach-or, for that mat-
ter, any conduct within a contractual relation-is not an isolated incident
that just happens to take place. Rather, it is systematically related to other
contractual behaviors, it is part of a pattern, and this propensity is deter-
mined by some underlying choice or disposition of the promisor (which
itself can be either detectable or undetectable.) We modeled this
choice/disposition as an investment that costs money. In the model, once this
investment was made, it had a systematic effect on two behaviors of the
promisor-the frequency of detectable (Terrible quality) and of nondetect-
able (Mediocre quality) breaches. In the real world, once a party invests in
building his integrity and capacity, these have a systematic effect on many
behaviors down the road, one of which is the decision to commit willful
breach. The party with low integrity is more likely to commit willful breach.
To be sure, willfulness is often thought of as a state of mind, not a fail-
ure-to-invest problem. In this sense, the model does not provide an
explanation for the specific "mens rea" factor. And yet, the concept of will-
fulness is notoriously undefined, and Richard Craswell shows nicely that it
26cannot be defined merely by reference to a mental state. Instead, the analy-
sis here suggests that willful breach is not a characteristic of the action but a
legal conclusion. It is a tag attached to behaviors that reveal information
about some underlying systematic pattern, distinct from the breach itself.
In the numerical example, as in the real world, the supercompensatory
increment of damages depends on the detection likelihood and the harm
from undetected breach. It is not plausible that courts would know this
26. See Craswell, supra note 6, at 1502-07.
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likelihood and the undetected harm. This analysis, therefore, does not pro-
vide a neat formula to help courts assess the magnitude of excess damages.
Still, even if hard to implement with mathematical precision, the analysis
provides an understanding of the factors that ought to be considered when
damages are assessed. We demonstrate below, in the doctrinal section, how
this is done in practice.
Thus, what emerges from applying the model to the willful breach con-
text is the insight that willful breach is punished more heavily not for its
own harm, but for the mesh of systematically related behaviors that are un-
desirable and reduce the overall surplus, but go undetected. These behaviors
are noncontractible-they represent deviation from the "spirit" of the obli-
gation, what the model identified as the difference between Mediocre and
Standard quality-and therefore nonsanctionable. The way they can be in-
fluenced is not by direct monitoring and deterrence, but rather by changing
the ex ante incentive to engage in them and influencing the promisor to be-
come a High-investment/high-integrity type.
The idea that some breaches are only the "tip of the iceberg" and are
linked to additional undetected infractions invokes two alternative accounts
of linkage. One account, which we do not develop here but which can have
some purchase in the criminal law punishment of intent, is that the wrong-
doer's actions are all linked through his "character." 7 It is his underlying
bad personality, or behavioral predisposition, that renders this party more
likely to commit a whole slew of undesirable acts. When one act is ob-
served, a character linkage is then relied on to infer other acts and to justify
a harsher punishment. An alternative account, which is the one invoked here,
is that the wrongdoer's actions are all linked, not through a behavioral link-
age, but through a "technological" linkage. The wrongdoer's miscellaneous
acts are part of a unifying pattern because of an ex ante choice he made,
which subsequently rendered many types of breach more beneficial to him
and thus more likely. Our focus on such technological linkages also helps us
narrow the scope of the application of the theory. Willful actors are punished
for other types of probabilistic conduct within this relationship, against the
same aggrieved party. They are not punished for being nasty per se, or for
being bad citizens.
C. The Efficiency of Supercompensatory Damages
This model provides a different account of efficient damages than the
standard "efficient breach" paradigm. The standard paradigm requires dam-
ages to equal the lost value from breach, or else efficient breach would be
27. See, e.g., Russel Dean Covey, Exorcizing Wechsler's Ghost: The Influence of the Model
Penal Code on Death Penalty Sentencing Jurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 235 (2004)
(noting that under the character theory of punishment, "the purpose of retribution is not to propor-
tion the punishment to the evil of the act, but rather to proportion the punishment to the evil of the
character to whom the act is attributed"); Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punish-
ment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L. 719, 733 (1992)
("[Character] theory rests on the idea that in punishing we judge not only the action but also the
person revealed by the action").
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deterred . In the model here, this form of ex post allocative efficiency can
indeed be compromised, because the promisor might prefer to perform even
at a high cost rather than breach and pay the supercompensatory damages.
This effect was absent in the numeric example studied above, since Ter-
rible performance was never chosen when the ex ante investment was high
and the optimal supercompensatory damages were never high enough to
induce inefficient performance when the ex ante investment was low. In real
situations, supercompensatory damages can lead to inefficient performance
both when ex ante investment is low and when ex ante investment is high.
In these situations the two efficiency perspectives seemingly collide: su-
percompensatory damages are good because they improve the ex ante
investment and they are bad because they deter efficient breach. Still, it is a
standard view that the latter problem (but not the former) can be easily over-
come by renegotiation. That is, if a contingency arises in which it is efficient
to breach but too costly because of high damages, the parties can agree to
release the promisor from its obligation.2 9 It is in the interest of both parties
to find a mutually agreeable price to make this release possible. This private
solution cannot solve the ex ante underinvestment problem, because by vir-
tue of its precontractual timing, it is not contractible.
D. From Moral Hazard to Adverse Selection
The model developed in Section A is a moral hazard model. The promi-
sor chose an inadequate level of unobservable ex ante investment. The goal
was to induce the promisor to choose the efficient level of investment. We
showed that when an inefficiently low investment leads to both sanctionable
and nonsanctionable breaches, imposing supercompensatory damages on the
sanctionable breaches can compensate for the inability to impose damages on
the nonsanctionable breaches, thus inducing efficient ex ante investment. In
other words, sanctioning one breach can substitute for the inability to sanc-
tion another breach, due to the common ex ante investment, which creates a
"technological" linkage between the sanctionable and nonsanctionable
breaches.
While our focus is on this moral hazard model and the technological
linkage that it assumes, we briefly discuss the alternative, adverse selection
model that provides a similar rationale for increased sanction by assuming a
character linkage between the sanctionable and nonsanctionable breaches.
In the adverse selection model, there is no ex ante choice of investment lev-
el. Rather there are two types of promisors, a low-integrity type and a high-
integrity type. Each promisor's inherent integrity is determined by "nature"
and is not a result of failure to invest properly. Individuals' integrity types
are unobservable. According to one interpretation, integrity can be thought
28. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 118-22.
29. See Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 E2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992); William P.
Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 15 RAND. J. ECON. 39
(1984).
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of as a nonmonetary fairness cost that the promisor bears when he tenders
low-quality performance. A high-integrity promisor bears a high fairness
cost, and thus will provide high-quality performance even when the breach
is expected to be nonsanctionable. The low-integrity promisor, on the other
hand, bears a low fairness cost and thus might shade and provide low-
quality performance when breach is nonsanctionable.
The imperfect detection theory explains how supercompensatory dam-
ages can be used to align the incentives of the low-integrity promisor. When
detection is stochastic, the low-integrity promisor will face an expected
sanction equal to the probability of detection multiplied by the damages
amount. If only compensatory damages are assessed for detected breaches,
the ex ante expected sanction will be too low to deter all inefficient breach-
es. Supercompensatory damages increase the expected sanction and improve
efficiency. They compensate for those breaches that go undetected. When
low integrity underlies a detected breach of contract, it is fair to assume that
other, undetected breaches were committed. The detected breach reveals
information about the promisor's type, and it is this information that justifies
the increased damages award.
The adverse selection model differs from the moral hazard model in im-
portant ways. The moral hazard model justifies the imposition of
supercompensatory damages even when it is known that the breach will be
punished with a probability of 100 percent; the supercompensatory damages
substitute for the inability to punish other nonsanctionable breaches. In the
adverse selection model, in contrast, supercompensatory damages are more
difficult to justify when one breach is sanctionable and the other is nonsanc-
tionable. This strategy would only reinforce the low-integrity promisor's
incentive to avoid sanctionable acts; it would do nothing to deter the non-
sanctionable acts. Thus, such supercompensatory damages cannot be
justified on deterrence grounds. They could be justified, though, on retribu-
tive grounds: the promisor deserves to be punished because of his revealed
low-integrity character. This account might resonate in the context of crimi-• 30
nal punishment. But it is hard to justify in a contract law setting. The
promisee will refuse to pay a higher price for supercompensatory damages
that provide no deterrence benefit (and, in fact, entail a deterrence cost).
And if the lawmakers attempt to follow a retribution theory and set a high
damages default rule, parties would opt out of this default.
II. WILLFUL BREACH DOCTRINE
In this Section we go through several possible applications of the willful
breach doctrine and examine whether they are consistent with the theoretical
model developed in Part I.
30. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Character Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Char-
acter to our Moral Culpability Judgments, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 59; supra note 27
and accompanying text.
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A. Overcompensatory Expectation Damages
Even without looking to tort law, courts sometimes award overcompen-
satory expectation damages. In theory, overcompensatory expectation
damages are an oxymoron. In practice, contract doctrine allows much flexi-
bility in measuring expectation damages, and courts choose higher measures
when they consider the breach willful or in bad faith. These questions arise
most often in construction contracts and other service contracts, when the
court is required to choose between the lower, diminution-in-market-value
measure of the defective service and a higher measure based on the cost of
completing the performance (or repairing a noncomplying performance).
In Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,3 the builder used a different brand of
pipe than what the contract specified. The installed pipes were equally good,
hence no diminution in value, and it would have been prohibitively costly to
fix the nonconformity and replace the pipes. Judge Cardozo, in the passage
quoted in the Introduction,32 emphasized the role of willfulness. Since the
nonconformity was considered unintentional, the lower measure of damages
applied. Had it been deliberate, the contractor would have been liable for the
full cost of repair. Many courts follow this heuristic.33
Our information theory can rationalize this doctrine. Construction con-
tracts usually contain detailed specifications of multiple performance
dimensions. When the contractor deliberately breaches one specification, it
becomes more likely (as a matter of statistical inference about past behav-
ior) that the contractor had an underlying "propensity" or policy to chisel.
This does not have to be an outright policy of active search for opportunities
to "save" or chisel. It can also be the product of a general lack of attention to
contractual terms or a general laxity in quality control-what we modeled
as a low ex ante investment. This ex ante choice of a general inadequate ad-
herence to quality may well have resulted in many other undetected
deviations. It is this underlying choice that is being (indirectly) scrutinized
by the damage measure.
Of course, it may sometimes be difficult to ascertain whether an act is
intentional and part of a pattern. The dissent in Jacob & Youngs differed
with Judge Cardozo on this issue, arguing that the contractor's choice to
install the wrong pipes was deliberate and should be subject to the super-
compensatory measure of damages. 34 The information theory developed here
provides a theoretical basis for choosing between the different conceptions
of willfulness and bad faith by directing the court to consider whether the
conduct in question is part of a hard-to-detect pattern.
The question in Jacob & Youngs and similar cases is commonly framed
as a question of measurement: how should the owner's expectation interest
be measured? This framing presumes that damages should be compensatory
31. SeeJacob &Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921).
32. See supra text accompanying note 7.
33. See Marschall, supra note 5.
34. See Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 892.
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and proceeds to ask what measure of damages achieves the compensatory
goal. Our analysis breaks with this tradition. It recognizes that cost-of-
completion damages may well be overcompensatory, and provides a justifi-
cation for this deviation from the compensation principle.
Our analysis also differs from the standard law-and-economics account of
the cost-of-completion measure, an account that focuses on ex post efficiency.
This standard account is primarily concerned with the overdeterrence effect of
supercompensatory damages." Under our analysis, the perspective is on the
ex ante pattern of conduct that willful breach is part of. From this perspective,
extra damages provide a necessary incentive. And as suggested in Section I.C
above, the possible overdeterrence of efficient breach can be resolved through
ex post bargaining.36
The imperfect detection theory supports higher, cost-of-completion
damages in construction cases, where insufficient ex ante investment can
lead to multiple undetected breaches. The theory cannot justify high dam-
ages in other cases where the courts struggle with identifying the
appropriate measure of expectation damages. For example, in several min-
ing cases courts were required to assess damages for the mining company's
31failure to restore the land as specified in the contract with the land owner.
Unlike the construction contracts discussed above, in which the builder is
under countless obligations, these mining contracts commonly impose only
two easily verifiable obligations on the mining company-to pay the land
owners royalties for mining their land and to restore the land after the min-
ing operations are complete. Here, undetected breaches are unlikely, and so
the imperfect detection theory cannot justify supercompensatory damages.
B. Tort Damages for Bad-Faith Breach
Traditional contract damages are intended to be compensatory, but in
certain contexts a breached-against party can recover damages that go be-
yond redress of the compensatory interest. One of the most prominent
examples is the tort remedy for bad faith breach of an insurance contract by
the insurer. An insured can recover more than contract damages, including
punitive damages, if the insurer denied benefits intentionally, knowing that
there was no reasonable basis for the denial." In the United States, this is
considered a tort remedy, but only in order to overcome the no-punitive-
damages rule of contract law. Stripped of its doctrinal clothing, it is
35. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 3, at 121.
36. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Effi-
cient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. Rav. 629 (1988).
37. See, e.g., Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1939); Peevyhouse v.
Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
38. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
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essentially a specific remedy for willful breach of the insurance contract
(and some other select species of contracts).3 9
Often, this doctrine is justified on the basis of increased harm (e.g., emo-
tional distress to an aggrieved insured, increased secondary harm from
delay, or attorney's fees). But it is striking that in justifying the infliction of
punitive damages, courts often make reference to the insurer's systematic
and hard-to-detect pattern of deviations from the spirit of its obligation,
which went beyond the specific denial at issue. In the leading case Campbell
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., State Farm Insurance ar-
gued that its breach (the denial of benefits) was a singled-out "honest
mistake," but the Utah Supreme Court found that it was part of a national
scheme intended to pay claimants less than what their policies entitled
them-a pattern of "trickery and deceit."0 Because this systematic conduct
"'would evade detection in many instances'" it should be more heavily
sanctioned "'on those few occasions where it was discovered.' ,4 Put differ-
ently, State Farm had to pay more than compensatory damages because it
chose a low-value, low-integrity policy. It even gave it a name: "'Perform-
ance, Planning, and Review,' or PP & R policy. '42 Many manifestations of
this policy were unobservable. To deter insurers from engaging in such low-
integrity policies, a punitive component was added to the damage measure.
Indeed, this is a common finding in insurance cases awarding punitive dam-
ages: the presence of a "comprehensive" policy to deny or terminate
expensive claims, in violation of the principle of looking at each claim indi-
vidually, on a case-by-case basis.43
Interestingly, when the Campbell case came before the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Court ordered a significant reduction in the punitive damages,
from a multiplier of 145 to a multiplier not exceeding a single digit. In do-
ing so, the Supreme Court rejected the pattern-of-systematic-bad-behavior
justification: "The [Utah] courts awarded punitive damages to punish and
deter conduct that bore no relation to the Campbells' harm. A defendant's
dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was prem-
ised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. '"44 Despite this specific
rejection of the "pattern" theory, the theory pervades through much of the
insurance law damages doctrine and provides justification for increased
damages.
Note that in other contexts the problem of undetected breach can be
solved without punitive damages. When a phone company or a credit card
39. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: DAMAGES § 59.2 (rev. ed. 2005)
(explaining that the classification into tort law is meant to serve the purpose of increasing damages).
40. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1147-57 (Utah 2001), rev'd,
538 U.S. 408 (2003).
41. Id. at 1151 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 941 (Utah 1993)).
42. Id. at 1143.
43. Hangarter v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1011 (9th Cir. 2004).




company charge their customers excessive fees beyond what is contractually
allowed, many customers will not detect the breach. But the uniformity of
conduct across cases makes these violations eligible to be pursued by class
representatives, through class actions. In the insurance context, by contrast,
undetected violations and harms differ across cases and depend on context,
thus they cannot be redressed in the aggregate and need to be subject to pu-
nitive damages. There are a few other contexts in which this rationale
applies, and in which courts agree to levy exemplary damages.45
The tort damages for bad faith breach cases demonstrate that the infor-
mation-based theory can support a mandatory, nondisclaimable, rule of
supercompensatory damages. Until now, the argument supported supercom-
pensatory damages only when the parties would have stipulated such
increased damages in a complete contract. That is, it was an argument for a
default rule. But when the pattern of breaches cuts across contracts, in-
creased damages in one contract can deter the pattern and thus generate a
positive externality on other contracts. And there is no reason why one pro-
misee would want to pay the higher price that increased damages entail if
she reaps only a small portion of the deterrence benefits that these high
damages create. Put differently, each promisee would want to stipulate low
damages in her contract and to free ride on the high damages in other con-
tracts without paying a higher contract price. In equilibrium all promisees
will opt out of the high damages default, resulting in a Pareto inferior out-
come. In the presence of such externalities, the default rule justification for
supracompensatory damages no longer holds, and supracompensatory dam-
ages can only be sustained as an immutable rule. Here again the invocation
of tort principles proves handy.
C. Restitution
In some circumstances, the law enables the aggrieved party to recover in
restitution in lieu of expectation damages, even if this remedy is compensa-
tory.46 High restitution awards are traditionally rationalized as necessary to
prevent unjust enrichment from an intentional breach. In some cases, they
can also be justified under our information theory.
For example, after signing a detailed contract the promisor deviates from
the contractual specifications in a way that reduces the cost of performance
without affecting the market value of the performance to the promisee. Ac-
cording to the proposed Third Restatement of Restitution, the promisee is
entitled to recover the reduction in performance costs.47 This rule can be
justified under the information theory if the detected deviation, which did
45. For exemplary damages in banking and employment cases, see PERLLO, supra note 39,
at 386-87.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345 (1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RES-
TITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39, illus. 7, 9.
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not harm the promisee, was likely accompanied by additional undetected
48deviations that did harm the promisee.
The information theory stops short, however, of justifying a wholesale
extension of the disgorgement remedy to any profitable breach. Many of the
applications of this remedy in Section 39 of the proposed Third Restatement
of Restitution involve single breach incidents that do not necessarily corre-
late with a pattern of rent-seeking behavior. If a tenant breaches the lease
and sublets the apartment without the landlord's consent or if a buyer
breaches a sale contract and resells the goods in competition with the
seller,49 these are scenarios in which the breaching party acted against its
sole post payment obligation. These parties may be engaging in efficient
substitution, which the disgorgement remedy could inefficiently discourage.
Within our theory, it is hard to see how such isolated breach acts, however
severe, point to patterns of undetected misconduct that would justify the
supercompensatory remedy.
CONCLUSION
There are two striking aspects to the law of willful breach. The first is
the pervasive sense that willful breach is worse, and deserving of greater
sanction, than inadvertent breach. The second is the difficulty in defining
willful breach, given that most breaches are a result of some voluntary deci-
sion by the promisor but not all are abusive. The thesis developed in this
paper tries to clarify both aspects. It suggests that the definition of willful
breach lies not in some intrinsic characterization of the mental state of the
promisor. Rather, willful breach is the tag attached to behaviors that reveal
information about some underlying bad trait, distinct from the breach itself.
What makes a trait bad is that it is associated with a pattern of undetected
value-skimming conduct. Thus, willful breach in our theory is a device that
encapsulates information. It is this information that justifies the harsher re-
medial consequence.
48. The proposed rule would also apply to cases of unintentional breach. See id. at illus. 14.
This can be justified if the breach, while unintentional ex post, is the product of intentionally low ex
ante investments in quality control, which could generate multiple undetected breaches.
49. Id. at illus. 8, 10.
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